In this paper, we intend to offer an interpretation about the explanation of the (relative) idea of pure substance in general on John Locke’s philosophy, from Thomas Reid’s notion of ‘natural suggestion’. To achieve this aim, after contextualizing Locke’s notion of pure substance in general and distinguishing it from the idea of particular substance (section 1), we explicit that Locke’s words about the source of the idea of the former in the mind (either empirical or rational) are ambiguous and inconclusive (...) (section 2). Then, we argue that the parallels between this idea and that of ‘relation’, as well as of ‘power’ do not assist in that answer, due to some problems we identify on them (section 3). Finally, we argue that the Reidian explanation for the source of the idea of ‘mind’, from the notion of ‘natural suggestion’ allows us to i) avoid those problems and ii) inasmuch as, according to this interpretation, the idea of pure substance in general would have an empirical source, Lockian empiricism would remain intact (section 4). (shrink)

The paper states a hypothesis concerning Thomas Reid's moderation in his reply to skepticism. It is initially argued that commonsense beliefs, though due to reliable faculties, are doubtful, fallible, and correctable. They are not completely immune to skeptical attack. It is further argued that Reid intends to reply only to one form of skepticism, the partial one – the skepticism of authors who accept at least one mental faculty as a reliable source of knowledge. Reid does not intend to argue (...) with the skeptic who equally denies his assent to the reliability of all faculties – that is, the radical skeptic. This radical form of skepticism is harmless to practical life and philosophy and, for that reason, is not a threat. Finally, the hypothesis advanced is discussed considering other interpretations of Reid’s reply to skepticism. (shrink)

The paper discusses Leonhard Euler’s theses in Reflections on space and time. After a brief introduction to the debate about the nature of space and time in the 17th and 18th centuries and Euler’s position in it (section 1), the paper advances two hypotheses. Based on an approach to Isaac Newton’s writings, it is argued that Euler understands the notion of “reflection” as a rational activity of thought (section 2). Furthermore, it is argued that Euler’s silence about the nature of (...) absolute space and time must be understood in the same way as Newton’s refusal to discuss the nature of gravity. Space/time and gravity exist; however, their natures are not accessible to the human mind (section 3). (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that George Berkeley's philosophy does not overcome solipsism. In order to do this, it presents four difficulties on his arguments for other existences: (I) the argument about the existence of an external cause for sensitive ideas faces the difficulty of not eliminating the possibility that the mind itself is the cause of these ideas; (II) the argument present in the Dialogues to prove the existence of God is circular: it presupposes the existence of objects distinct (...) from the mind, however, the argument for the existence of these objects presupposes the existence of God; (III) the argument in favor of the existence of those objects, besides being related to the mentioned circularity, is developed without Berkeley presenting a clear notion of what these objects are; (IV) the argument for the existence of other minds, in what appears to be their most plausible interpretation – which states that it is possible to infer the existence of other minds from the observation of irregular, inconstant, and vicious actions in subjects –, faces the difficulty that, in a scenario where such actions do not exist, Berkeley loses the evidence for the existence of other minds. (shrink)

The paper discusses the notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘reflection’ in John Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding. It attempts to present two criteria by means of which it would be possible to distinguish between these mental activities. Firstly, consciousness is a passive, involuntary activity and does not depend on attention to be exerted, unlike reflection, which is, at least in one of its degrees – since Locke conceives the existence of two degrees of reflection –, an active, voluntary, and attentive (...) activity of mind. Second, consciousness may be distinguished from reflection in that it is a mental activity that produces judgments / beliefs, unlike reflection, whose activities only produce ideas. While consciousness allows human beings to know – to judge about and to believe the existence of their mental phenomena –, reflection is only a mental capacity to have ideas and, as such, it is not true or false. (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that, in Thomas Reid's reading, David Hume's skepticism of the Treatise on Human Nature is not solely due to his acceptance of the ‘ideal hypothesis’ – the principle according to which ideas are the immediate objects of the mental operations –, but it has another source, namely, that doubt on the reliability of the faculties of the senses, memory, and reason. Moreover, the paper argues that the suggested distinction between two roots for Hume’s skepticism allows (...) a more exact view on Reid’s reading of Hume and solve some misinterpretations. (shrink)

En este artículo se desarrolla la hipótesis de que el conocimiento de la sustancia pensante en las Meditaciones sobre la filosofía primera y en Objeciones y Respuestas no es claramente explicitado por René Descartes. Se entiende que tal exposición es necesaria para una comprensión integral delestatus de la filosofía cartesiana en el momento de redactar las Meditaciones y, principalmente, paraasimilar cómo concebía Descartes el conocimiento de la sustancia pensante en los años 1641 y 1642.El conocimiento de la sustancia pensante es, (...) como se sabe, un elemento fundamental para toda la filosofía cartesiana. Para ello, se recurre, primeramente, a los dos modos en que Descartes presentael conocimiento de la sustancia pensante en las Meditaciones, destacando los problemas que cadauno de estos conlleva. Posteriormente, a partir de las Objeciones y Respuestas, principalmentela quinta y la séptima, se presenta las críticas de Pierre Gassendi y Pierre Bourdin sobre elconocimiento de la sustancia pensante. Tanto Gassendi como Bourdin subrayan que el texto deMeditaciones no es suficiente para esclarecer de qué manera la sustancia pensante es conocida. En este sentido, Gassendi y Bourdin cuestionan la posibilidad de este conocimiento, destacando la ambiguedad y oscuridad de las respuestas cartesianas. Se concluye que en las Meditaciones,Descartes enfrenta una brecha insalvable entre la ontología de la sustancia y su conocimiento, loque lo llevará a desarrollar y explicar mejor su teoría en escritos posteriores. (shrink)

The paper covers the discussion of three aspects of Thomas Reid’s political thought. Initially, it presents and discusses Reid’s understanding of Politics. Secondly, it is argued that, unlike the first principles of other branches of knowledge, such as Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind and Morals, the first principles of Politics are not the first principles of common sense. Politics is founded on a form of empirical knowledge that cannot be identified with common sense, with the judgments and beliefs due to the (...) original constitution of mind that are shared by most humans. Finally, it is argued, from a parallel with the philosophy of nature, that common sense has only a methodological role in Politics. (shrink)

The paper aims to discuss the notion of ‘common sense’ in Thomas Reid’s philosophy. It presents two hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that the common sense that Reid uses in philosophical matters is nothing but the set of original principles of the mind that determine human beings in regard to their notions, beliefs and inclinations, as well as the judgments and beliefs that are due to these principles. The second hypothesis states that Reid understands a kind of ‘developed common sense’, (...) a common sense that develops throughout human life by the proper cultivation of the powers of the mind. (shrink)

The paper discusses the epistemological role of consciousness in Nicolas Malebranche's Recherche de la Vérité. After presenting the problem of how an epistemologically negative view of consciousness could represent an obstacle to the project of founding a ‘science of man’, it is argued that Malebranche understands ‘reflection’, a specific type of consciousness, as a pure / intellectual form of perception and therefore an unproblematic way of accessing mental phenomena from an epistemological point of view. Reflection could be the foundation of (...) the science of man. (shrink)

O artigo discute a primeira ‘Carta’ de John Locke a Edward Stillingfleet e problematiza suas respostas às críticas direcionadas à sua teoria da substância. Apresenta-se (seção 1) o que parece ser, para Locke, o coração do ataque de Stillingfleet à sua doutrina da substância, a acusação de que os princípios do Ensaio ‘quase descartam a substância da parte razoável do mundo’. Problematizam-se ambas as respostas de Locke a essa objeção: (seção 2) sua negação de compromisso com o princípio de que (...) o conhecimento dependeria da aquisição de ideias claras e distintas e (seção 3) sua negação de compromisso com uma forma de ceticismo ou uma forma de dogmatismo negativo em relação à existência das substâncias. Na sequência (seção 4), sublinha-se que Locke mantém, na ‘Carta’, a tensão entre uma explicação empírica e uma explicação racional para a ideia de substância enquanto suporte ou substrato. Por fim, (seção 5) discute-se as dificuldades dos comentários de Locke sobre o caráter relativo da ideia de substrato. (shrink)

The paper advances two hypotheses concerning Thomas Reid’s reading of George Berkeley’s immaterialist system. First, it is argued that, on Reid’s view, Berkeley is skeptic about the existence of the objects of the material world, not in virtue of a doubt about the senses but for his adoption of the principle that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of mind. On Reid’s view, that principle is a skeptical principle by its own nature. Secondly, it is argued that Berkeley (...) really accepts in his system the notion of ‘idea’ such as Reid understands it, namely, as an entity distinct from mind and its operations. (shrink)

This article puts forward two hypotheses about David Hume’s position on the epistemic status of consciousness. Firstly, it is argued that Hume does not offer any explicit argument in favor of the thesis that the mind cannot be mistaken about a mental state of which it is conscious, and some possible interpretations that could offer this argument are questioned. Secondly, it is argued that Hume is committed to the thesis that the mind is conscious of all its mental phenomena as (...) they occur, and the passages in which the philosopher seems to refer to non-conscious mental operations — which would contradict that thesis — are explained on the basis of a theory of degrees of consciousness according to the vividness of perceptions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper advances the hypothesis that David Hume does not define consciousness as ‘perception or reflected thought’ such as a passage from the twenty-eighth paragraph of the ‘Appendix’ to the Treatise of Human Nature seems to suggest. From the observation of some difficulties related to the understandings of consciousness as ‘perception’ and ‘reflected thought’, it is argued that, in that passage, Hume has in view the phenomenon of self-consciousness, that is, the way in which the self is conscious of (...) itself. (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that some difficulties in René Descartes reflections on the idea of mind in his ‘Objections and Responses’ would unintentionally lead him to a ‘bundle theory’. In this sense, Descartes would not have been successful in showing that the mind would be something beyond the set of its modes or attributes. This hypothesis is based upon Descartes’ replies to Thomas Hobbes, Antoine Arnauld, Pièrre Gassendi and Marin Mersenne – third, fourth, fifth and sixth sets of objections (...) respectively. (shrink)

This thesis aims to discuss Thomas Reid’s (1710-1796) theory of the first principles of knowledge, more particularly, the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. In the first chapter, I discuss Reid’s foundationalist commitments in philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I argue that he is clearly a foundationalist about speculative and moral knowledge, but it is not clear if he keeps foundationalist commitments with regard to political knowledge – the first principles of politics are not self-evident beliefs: (...) they are not justified from the start and, therefore, they do not have what is needed for being basic beliefs in a foundationalist view of the structure of knowledge. In the second chapter, I discuss Reid’s understanding of the sources of speculative, moral and political knowledge, namely, common sense and knowledge of mankind. I argue that while philosophy of mind and morals are based upon the first principles of common sense – immediate and irresistible beliefs due to the original constitution of mind, politics is based upon first principles of the knowledge of mankind – beliefs that are due to a mixture of the sagacity and the experience of the political scientist who lives among other human beings in a political society. In the third chapter, I try to explain Reid’s comprehension on the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I try to explain what a first principle of knowledge is, how to understand the distinction between the principles of contingent and necessary truths and what the means we have to identify the first principles of knowledge are. The fourth and last chapter is entirely dedicated to common sense. More particularly, I discuss how Reid defends the first principles of common sense from the skeptical attack. (shrink)

Little attention has been paid to the fact that Thomas Reid's epistemology applies to ‘political reasoning’ as well as to various operations of the mind. Reid was interested in identifying the ‘first principles’ of political science as he did with other domains of human knowledge. This raises the question of the extent to which the study of human action falls within the competence of ‘common sense’. Our aim is to reconstruct and assess Reid's epistemology of the sciences of social action (...) and to determine how it connects with the fundamental tenets of his general epistemology. In the first part, we portray Reid as a methodological individualist and focus on the status of the first principles of political reasoning. The second part examines Reid's views on the explanatory power of the principles of human action. Finally, we draw a parallel between Reid's epistemology and the methodology of Weberian sociology. (shrink)